It is hard to overestimate Paul Meehl's influence on the psychology of judgment and decision making. His "disturbing little book" Clinical versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence is known as attacking human judgment and calling for replacing clinicians by linear actuarial methods. More than forty years later, fast and frugal heuristics-proposed as models of human judgment-were formalized, tested, and found to be surprisingly accurate, often more that the linear models Meehl advocated. We ask three questions: Do the findings of the two programs contradict each other? More generally, how are the programs conceptually connected? Is there anything they can learn from each other?
Introduction
Paul E. Meehl (1920 Meehl ( -2003 does not fall into any ready-made category. In his autobiography, he characterized himself as "a clinical psychologist who also ran rats and knew how to take a partial derivative" (Meehl, 1989, p. 354; Meehl, 1954, p. vii; 1973) . Influenced by Karl Menninger's famous book, The Human Mind, he turned to psychology in order to become a psychotherapist (Meehl, 1986; 1989, p. 339) , but graduated from the University of Minnesota, where most psychologists (Hathaway, Paterson, Skinner) were strongly skeptical of psychodynamic theories and where "the scholarly ethos was objective, skeptical, quantitative, and behavioristic" (Meehl, 1989, p. 345) . He was a clinician, trained in the Freudian tradition, but open to other methodologies. He was strongly interested in theoretical and philosophical issues (Meehl, 1989, pp. 340, 373) . And he was an experimentalist, studying rats in the behaviorist tradition (McCorquodale & Meehl, 1951; Meehl & McCorquodale, 1953) , and human subjects in personality psychology (Meehl & Dahlstrom, 1960) . Evidence (1954) . The influence of this classic can hardly be overestimated. Together with seminal papers published in the fifties (Edwards, 1954; Hammond, 1955; Simon, 1956) , it gave a decisive impulse to the study of human judgment (Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997) . The book testifies of the diverse interest of its author. Echoing both Meehl's clinical practice and his knowledge of actuarial methods, like the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to which he himself contributed, the book presents a nuanced appraisal of the nature and value of clinical judgments.
Meehl is mostly known for his book, Clinical versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the
In chapter 8, the core of the book, Meehl reviews twenty empirical studies that compare the accuracy of clinical judgments to actuarial methods when a prognosis has to be made, that is, a medical classification on the basis of a patient's given characteristics (e.g., whether a sixty-five year-old male patient who complains of strong chest pain, will develop ischemic heart disease). Meehl's results have been replicated numerous times: whatever their experience, theoretical commitments, feedback opportunities, or information, clinicians are usually outperformed by actuarial methods (for more recent reviews see Dawes et al., 1989; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000) .
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On the other hand, fast and frugal heuristics-recently proposed by Gigerenzer and colleagues as psychologically plausible accounts of human judgment-were found to be outperforming linear actuarial such as multiple regression and unit-weight linear models, the very methods that beat clinical judgment in the studies survey by Meehl (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000) . What is behind these puzzlingly contradictory findings? The first goal of this article is to question this apparent contradiction by contrasting the requirements of fast and frugal heuristics to be successful with the conditions the clinical judge has to face.
The second goal of this article is to explore the similarities of the conceptual view of heuristics inherent in Meehl's program on the one hand and in the fast and frugal heuristics program on the other. These similarities reveal themselves at a more careful reading of Meehl's "disturbing little book" and refer to aspects of his position that are often overlooked. Specifically, we argue that both Meehl and the fast and frugal heuristics program share a concern for developing (a) domain-specific models of judgment and (b) non-linear process models that take into account the bounded nature of cognition. By elaborating these similarities, we will also trace the conceptual roots of the fast and frugal heuristics in the early days of research on judgment and decision making.
Third, by contrasting the two research programs, we highlight what they can learn from the other. For instance, although in many of the studies surveyed by Meehl the actuarial models used simple unit-weights, they were compensatory and thus relatively complex and insensitive to the limited time, information, and computational power of the clinical judge (note that this might also explain why Meehl's plea of using actuarial methods in the clinical practice more often has had little effect). Fast and frugal heuristics, by contrast, explicitly acknowledge the requirements and limits faced by cognitively bounded decision makers in the real world, and we speculate that by virtue of these properties they might be acceptable for clinicians. We illustrate how heuristics can serve as actuarial methods for quick, effortless and clinician-friendly prognostic prediction that compete well with, or even outperform, more complex actuarial methods. Conversely, Meehl insisted on the importance of understanding how the clinical judge operates. Fast and frugal heuristics, however, have only rarely 2 Paul Meehl and Fast and Frugal Heuristics been applied to professional decision making (for a few exceptions, see Green & Mehr, 1997, and Dhami, 2003) . Testing the descriptive adequacy of the heuristics in the clinical domain is an important challenge. Meehl and Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Contradictions? One of the central messages of Paul Meehl's classic work is that actuarial models, such as weighted and unit-weight linear models, are often more accurate than clinicians' intuitive heuristics. This finding led to a much more critical attitude towards unaided human judgment and fueled efforts to improve human judgment and to understand more rigorously what processes are underlying human judgment. These efforts led to the identification of a number of deficiencies in the judgment process, which were taken to explain the inferiority of clinical compared to statistical judgment.
More than forty years later, Gigerenzer and his colleagues (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1996; Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group, 1999) proposed simple, non-linear, heuristics such as like Take The Best (TTB; to be described shortly), which are firmly rooted in bounded rationality and as such intended to provide descriptive models of judgments by "real minds … under constraints of limited knowledge and time" (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 5) . Testing these simple heuristics against models akin to Meehl's statistical models in computer simulations, Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, and Goldstein (1999) showed that both complex and simpler (i.e., unit weight) linear actuarial methods are good, but that TTB, a yet simpler, nonlinear noncompensatory heuristic that ignores information can be even better.
Moreover, as research reviewed shortly has shown, people actually seem to be using such simple heuristics when making decisions, suggesting that they also capture the processes underlying clinical judgment. Does this mean Meehl's conclusion that actuarial methods are superior to human judgment is wrong? What is behind this apparent contradiction?
First, on a more general level, it should be noted that both research programs converge in demonstrating the robust beauty of simplicity. Both fast and frugal heuristics and the linear models Meehl tested are mathematically simpler than other models used in statistics and actuarial science like, for instance, neural or Bayesian 3 Paul Meehl and Fast and Frugal Heuristics networks. Second, as to the contradictory implications concerning the accuracy of the mechanisms underlying human judgments, one should recall that in many of the studies included in Meehl's (1954) overview, the playing field for clinical and statistical judgments might have been quite uneven. For instance, often the statistical models were fed a preselected set of predictors, whereas the clinicians faced a considerably larger set of information and still had to sieve out the relevant predictors.
Moreover, in Meehl's overview it often remains relatively unclear how skilled the clinicians were and thus whether they had sufficient experience to weight the predictors appropriately.
i And finally, in some of the reported studies the clinician's judgment was part of the information entering the statistical models, which makes it almost impossible for the clinicians to beat the statistical models. Taken togetheralthough these points are not intended to throw into doubt his general conclusionsthey illustrate that the evidence presented by Meehl is not as straightforward. Diagnosis unfolds over time, as the product of an extended interaction between judge and patient, while in prognosis, the judge is simultaneously presented with all available information and cannot refine the prediction over time.
A second feature concerns the nonlinear character of human judgment. Meehl questioned whether linear models are able to capture human judgment (Meehl, 1954, p. 47) . Rather, referring to diagnosis, he seemed to have thought of diagnostic prediction as similar to the "psychological process which is involved in the creation of scientific theory", with recurrent generation, testing and refinement of hypotheses (Meehl, 1954, p. 65; Fiedler, 1978) . Unfortunately, Meehl did not develop this notion of the cognitive processes further, but it is apparent that he viewed nonlinearity as an important characteristic of human judgment.
We now describe the fast and frugal heuristics in greater detail and argue that they offer models of human judgment that accommodates these two features.
Moreover, we show how the nonlinearity of fast and frugal heuristics arises from the bounded nature of human cognition. This section concludes by discussing alternative models of judgment and in what way they capture the domain-specificity and nonlinearity of human judgment.
Heuristics are Domain-Specific and Ecologically Rational
Already in the preface of his book, Meehl points out that prediction in prognostic and diagnostic domains call for different methods. He writes: "There is no convincing reason to assume that explicitly formalized mathematical rules and the clinician's creativity are equally suited for any given kind of task, or that their comparative effectiveness is the same for different tasks" (Meehl, 1954, p. vi.) .
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At the end of his book, he extends the discussion of the differences between prediction in prognosis and diagnosis. In pure prognosis, "... all bad ideas tend to subtract from the power of good ones" (Meehl, 1954, p. 121, original emphasis) .
Specifically, a prognostic judgment is made at one point in time, based only on the information available at that point. In diagnosis, in contrast, a prediction is generated differently. Here, the clinical judge can operate by trial and error, and interact extensively with the patient, collecting new information in order to test his hypotheses. Bad ideas are not necessarily damaging in this context. On the contrary, they can trigger good hypotheses: "Nobody knows what the payoff rate is for these moment-to-moment guesses that come to therapists; but the overall success frequency might be considerably less than 50 percent and still justify the guessing [...] even if the to-be-discarded hypotheses were pure filler, they would not impede the therapy except as they consumed time" (Meehl, 1954, pp. 120-121; Meehl, 1989, p. 360) . In sum, by highlighting the differences between prognosis and diagnosis, Meehl calls for a greater recognition that the informational structure in different prediction tasks differ, and thus different processes may apply.
But how should such domain-specific cognitive processes be modeled in a formal way? The fast and frugal heuristics program provides one suggestion how to implement domain-specificity (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000) . Here, domain specificity is a consequence of ecological rationality, that is, the notion that cognitive processes, including those underlying judgment, are not only sensitive to, but even exploit the informational structures of the environments in which they operate (see also Brunswik, 1955; Simon, 1956 ).
Since different domains have different structures, processes vary across domains.
For example, when German and American students were asked to decide which of two objects has a larger value with respect to a criterion, say, which of San Diego or San Antonio is larger, they seemed to be using the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) . This heuristic is a simple rule: If you recognize only one of the two objects, infer that it has the larger criterion value. Not only did Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) find that people use the heuristic in 90% of the cases where it can be used; people even seemed to stick to the recognition heuristic when they received additional information on a high-validity cue that was in conflict with Intuitively, the use of the recognition heuristic is adaptive when recognition is positively correlated with the criterion. More specifically, it is possible to formally derive conditions under which an individual who, some of the time, uses the recognition heuristic will be more accurate than an individual who never uses the recognition heuristic, but relies on more general knowledge (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) . Furthermore, conditions have also been derived under which a group of people who use the recognition heuristic more often than another group, is more accurate Now, consider the situation in which both cities are recognized. This is the situation for which Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) proposed the TTB (Take The Best) heuristic. In this model, people are assumed to search for cues that are related to the criterion, such as the presence of a university or the existence of a soccer team.
Cues are inspected in order of decreasing validity (defined as the probability of a correct response given that the two options have a different value on the cue).
Someone using TTB makes a decision based on the first cue that discriminates between the options. All further cues are ignored, making the TTB a noncompensatory strategy. For example, say that the task is to infer which one of Berlin and Leipzig is more populous. Someone who recognizes both cities would then look up another cue. Let's say that the most valid cue they consider is the university cue. Because both cities have universities, the next most valid cue is considered.
Assuming that this is the soccer cue, Berlin-that has a team-will be picked because Leipzig does not have a team.
There has been considerable work on the descriptive adequacy of TTB. The proportion of participants using it seems to depend on a number of context factors (for a summary of arguments why this proportion may be considered low, see Newell, 2005) . First, time pressure seems to increase people's use of TTB (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999) . Second, the cost of information acquisition influences whether people select TTB or an integrative strategy: when cost of memory retrieval (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003) or information search (Bröder, 2000; Newell & Shanks, 2003 ) is high, people follow TTB closely. Moreover, there is accumulating evidence that people learn to use simple strategies when these strategies pay off (Bröder, 2003; Rieskamp & Otto, 2004) . Note that this empirical work demonstrates the contingent nature of people's strategy use and that different processes are at work in different domains.
In addition, the use of TTB is adaptive in environments with particular statistical structures, of which we mention three. First, when the regression weights are distributed in a noncompensatory way, that is, the weight of each cue is larger than the sum of the weights of the cues that are looked up after this cue in TTB, multiple regression cannot be more accurate than TTB (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002) .
Second, if cue validities are highly dispersed (for the precise meaning of this, see Katsikopoulos & Martignon, in press ) and cues are conditionally independent given the values of the objects on the criterion, then no method-linear or nonlinear-can be more accurate than TTB. For more conditions under which TTB is rational, we refer to the work by Hogarth and colleagues (Hogarth & Karaleia, 2004; Baucells, Carrasco, & Hogarth, 2005) . Third, TTB outperforms a unit-weight model when a judgment has to be made based on very little information, that is, in scarce environments (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002) .
It should be noted that adaptive decision making has its requirements.
Specifically, the claim that constraints of limited time and cognitive resources should lead to a switching to simpler strategies (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Beach, 1990) , possibly by foregoing some accuracy, implies that the decision maker is actually able to reliably assess the complexity (that is the cognitive costs) and Early attempts to formally model the cognitive processes underlying judgment using configural rules have been undertaken, for instance, by Einhorn et al. (1979) .
Compared to the specific configural rules designed for a specific application that these authors proposed (i.e, diagnosing a patient based on the MMPI score), fast and frugal heuristics, are more general, as they are composed of building blocks that model processes under a wider range of situations. To illustrate, TTB has a decision rule (specifying how to decide based on the available information), but there is also rules for searching and stopping the information search. In addition, the search, stopping, and decision rules of TTB are specified abstractly and not for concrete problems like diagnosis based on the MMPI.
As to the notion of simplicity, the robustness arising from simplicity was pointed out, perhaps surprisingly, already by Paul Meehl, who is credited for the insight that "in most practical situations an unweighted sum of a small number of 'big' variables will, on average, be preferable to regression equations" (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974, p. 105) . Indeed, Dawes (1971; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974) and Einhorn
and Hogarth (1975) tested such simple actuarial methods as to how well they are able to fit known data (check whether Dawes did not use cross validation) and found them to do as well as linear models where weights are not set to unity but chosen according to some statistical criterion.
After illustrating nonlinearity and ecological rationality, we now turn to another key concept notion of fast and frugal heuristics, which is inspired by Simon (1956) : the notion of bounded rationality.
Fast and Frugal Heuristics are Non-Linear and Boundedly Rational
Meehl emphasized that clinical prediction is made under conditions of considerable time pressure, limited information, and scarcity of feedback. Put differently, the resources of the clinician are bounded. As Meehl puts it, "... it is impossible for the clinician to get up in the middle of an interview, saying to the patient, "Leave yourself in suspended animation for 48 hours. Before I respond to your last remark, it is necessary for me to do some work on my calculating machine."" (Meehl, 1954, p. 81) : Clinical prediction has to be done on-line. More generally, the clinical domain induces bounded rationality.
Meehl did not elaborate on the theme of bounded rationality. Moreover, he did not attempt to connect it with the challenge of developing nonlinear models of the cognitive processes underlying judgment. Fast and frugal heuristics offer one possible solution to linking bounded rationality with nonlinearity. Here, nonlinearity is a consequence of bounded rationality, namely that the processes that generate a judgment must be simple-to acknowledge the limited time and computational capacity that the clinician has to deal with. It should be emphasized, however, that the simplicity of fast and frugal heuristics results in a specific kind of nonlinearity.
So how does nonlinearity arise from simplicity? As pointed out before, fast and frugal heuristics (e.g., TTB) do not integrate cues and are thus noncompensatory.
A decision is made after looking up only a fraction of the cues, and sometimes only one. For example, as we saw, someone using TTB decides on the basis of only the first discriminating cue. No matter how many cues contradict this discriminating cue, they cannot override it. Avoiding the integration of cues makes the fast and frugal heuristics nonlinear. In other words, fast and frugal heuristics also offer a solution to provide nonlinear models of human judgments, and the nonlinearity of the heuristics results from the hypothesized simplicity-particularly, the noncompensatoriness-of the processes.
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Einhorn (1970) discussed conjunctive and disjunctive rules, and was thus among the first to treat noncompensatory models in decision making. The study of fast and frugal heuristics like TTB builds upon this classic work, as lexicographic heuristics like TTB can be mimicked by combining them. Specifically, it can be shown that disjunctions of conjunctions are required to model TTB (Ling & Rothrock, 2003; Katsikopoulos, 2005) .
ii
Other Models
The foregoing is not to imply that research in the wake of Meehl (1954) has ignored the challenges of domain-specificity and nonlinearity that he posed to the study of human judgment. Here we briefly discuss how various prominent approaches in the judgment and decision making literature have tried to tackle these challenges.
As mentioned earlier, Meehl's (1954) results spurred efforts to better understand the cognitive processes underlying clinical judgment. Ironically, much of the ensuing research used models that are based on the notion of a linear combination of various pieces of information (Hoffman, 1960; Hammond, 1955) , that is, the type of model that Meehl had used to characterize actuarial methods.
First, it is important to point out that these early approaches take different stances on whether or not the linear models of judgments describe our cognitive processes (Brehmer, 1994 ; see also Gigerenzer & Kurz, 2001 ). On the one hand, researchers in the paramorphic tradition, such as Hoffman (1960) , were merely interested in modelling the relationship between input variables and output variables in judgment, and simply viewed linear regression as a conventional tool to describe this relationship (see Kurz-Milcke & Martignon, 2002) . In contrast to this "as if"-approach, proponents of the Brunswikian perspective (e.g., Hammond, 1955) , appeared to take linear models as describing people's actual cognitive processes. Over the years, however, the distinction between tool and model got lost, and the idea of weighing and integrating was generally accepted as a model of the cognitive process itself.
The main findings of this research can be summarized as follows (Brehmer, 1994) : Across a wide range of situations, linear models do a very good job at predicting the clinical judgment at a fixed point in time and the inclusion of nonlinear 11 Paul Meehl and Fast and Frugal Heuristics elements increases the predictive fit only slightly (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971) . But if we study the same judge at different points in time, clinical judges seem to weigh the available cues unreliably and inconsistently, reflecting human susceptibility to "boredom, fatigue, illness, [and] interpersonal distractions" (Goldberg, 1970, p. 423) .
Some researchers took these results as indicating that, essentially, the cognitive process involved in judgment is linear (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988) . Others remained skeptical of this linear models approach and developed models based on configural cues (e.g., Wiggins & Hoffman, 1968; Goldberg, 1971) . There, instead of assuming linear judges, it was hypothesised that people are sensitive also to the interactions between cues, and the judgments they generate thus nonlinear. The proposed configural models were often even more complex than the linear ones.
At the same time, an alternative account of nonlinear cognitive processes was beginning to emerge. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) concluded from their extensive review that "subjects are processing information in ways fundamentally different from […] regression models" and call for "more molecular analyses of the heuristic strategies that subjects employ when they integrate information" (p. 729). In the beginning of the seventies, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) finally broke both with the linear model and the configural model approaches and proposed that judges often use nonlinear and simple mental short-cuts. For instance, they proposed that people attend to the representativeness, rather than the predictive power of information for a prediction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) . However, they failed to clearly specify the underlying processes (Gigerenzer, 1996; Lopes, 1991 ; through see Kahneman & Tversky, 1996) .
All three approaches-the linear model, configural model, and the heuristics and biases approaches-had an enormous impact on research in psychology and other social sciences. However, none of them provided a strictly domain-specific account. It might be objected that by using varying cue weights in different contexts the linear model is able to capture processing changes across domains. But the pattern of changes in cue weights does not by itself show what the underlying mechanism is.
More generally, none of the accounts attempts to understand the interplay between strategies and environments.
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Concerning the nonlinearity challenge, one might argue that the configural model and the heuristics and biases approaches offered a solution. However, one can argue that they failed on other grounds: the configural model approach appears to too complex to be a valid description of the judge; and models provided by the heuristics and biases are not precise enough to yield quantitative predictions (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996 , but also Kahneman & Tversky, 1996) .
In this section, it was argued that the concern with domain-specific, nonlinear models of clinical judgment is one shared by Meehl and the program on fast and frugal heuristics. By focusing on the differences between the two programs we will now attempt to elaborate in what way they can learn from each other.
Meehl and Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Mutual Lessons
Meehl emphasized that clinical prediction can and should be improved. Meehl suggested replacing clinical judgment by actuarial methods, for instance linear models, whenever the latter are more suited. Clinicians, he argued, should dedicate their time and energy to the tasks that cannot be efficiently accomplished by actuarial methods, such as therapy. Nevertheless, Meehl was aware of the lack of impact his plea has had on clinical practice, and he complained about it (see Meehl, 1989, p. 380 ).
What might be behind the little resonance that Meehl's plea had produced?
One possibility is that these models place too high demands on peoples' time, information, and computational power. Fast and frugal heuristics, conversely, are specifically tuned to constraints of real-world decision making, while at the same time (as pointed out earlier in this article) carrying the potential of higher predictive accuracy than linear models. To illustrate this argument for the clinical domain, in this section we first review further evidence from the medical literature for the normative adequacy of the heuristics. In the second part of this section, we point out that whether clinicians would generally accept using heuristics more than they have accepted using linear models-a central concern of Meehl-is a future challenge for the program on fast and frugal heuristics.
Heuristics Can Be Simple and Accurate
So far we have focused on models to describe human judgment. We now argue that these same models can be used to formulate actuarial methods that are usable and accurate. We illustrate this claim with a model that is related to TTB, but tailored to the clinical domain. Green and Mehr (1997) tested the logistic regression of Long et al. (1993) against a so-called fast and frugal tree (Martignon, Vitouch, Takezawa, & Forster, 2003) which has been investigated as a model of classification. The regression instrument is widely considered to be one of the most accurate methods for judging whether a patient has a high risk of ischemic heart disease. The fast and frugal tree was, however, more accurate than logistic regression: it had an almost perfect true positive rate while its false negative rate was much lower than that of regressions with comparable true positive rates.
We clarify what fast and frugal trees are, by way of example. Consider the following medical decision: Should, or not, antibiotic treatment involving macrolides be prescribed to a young child suffering from community-acquired pneumonia? What makes this decision critical is that pathogens underlying this illness are often resistant to macrolides (Fischer et al., 2002) . If possible, physicians try to avoid ascribing heavy anti-biotic medication to children and only when physicians classify children's pneumonia as a microstreptococal infection do they give macrolides. Additionally, as pneumonia spreads rapidly among children and can lead to more serious problems (including death), the macrolide decision also needs to be made quickly.
The established technology for supporting decision making is known as decision analysis (see, e.g., von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986) . It is heavily based on the use of traditional normative models like Bayes' rule and expected utility theory and has been applied to the medical domain and many practitioners are exposed at least to its basics. Recently, however, the limitations of this approach are increasingly being discussed by physicians themselves (Elwyn, 2001; Green & Mehr, 1997) . The efforts of conscientious decision analysts notwithstanding, doctors still often feel at a loss when having to apply decision analysis on the spot, especially in situations with high stakes. Doctors prefer to use simple rules that are easy to communicate to the patients and easy to apply, rather than consult tables or other aids to computation.
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For these reasons, a team of pediatricians (Fischer et al., 2002) did not attempt to identify and integrate variables like probability and costs of pathogen resistance.
The first cue is whether the child is older than three years or not, and the second cue is whether the child has had fever for more than two days or not (we are not aware of the procedure by which it was decided to use there particular cut-offs for dichotomizing the two cues). These cues were used because it is basically guaranteed that pediatricians can have access to them, and because they are very easy to process.
Of course, one can imagine that doctors have easy access to other cues, as, for example, the occurrence of microstreptococal infection in the past. But, as we will see below, the age and fever duration cues suffice for greatly alleviating the problem of macrolide over-prescription. Now, the question is how to combine the cues. Recall that the primary goal is to guard against prescribing macrolides to children who do not need them. Thus, the cues can be combined so that macrolides are prescribed only when both cues suggest that the child is sick. A simple heuristic rule that implements this idea is the following:
"Prescribe macrolides only if the child is older than three years and the child has had fever for more than two days".
How successful is this heuristic? It seems to be transparent. Transparency, however, is not the only criterion of performance: time, money, and accuracy also matter when resources are limited. Because the tree uses only two cues, it does save time and costs. But how accurate is it? When the tree was evaluated and doublechecked on real data, it classified 72% of those children who actually were at high risk as having a high risk of microstreptococal pneumonia infection, while a scoring system based on logistic regression identified 75% of them. Also, the tree would curtail the prescription of macrolides by 68% and the scoring system by 75%.
This tree does not require the evaluation and combination of all possible outcomes for the options of prescribing and not prescribing macrolides. It only uses easily available cues about each child. The cues can be inspected in a simple sequential fashion. First, it can be asked whether the child is more than three years old. If the answer is "no", then it can be immediately concluded that macrolides should not be prescribed. If the answer is "yes", whether the child has had fever for more than two days will determine whether macrolides should be prescribed or not.
That is, the heuristic can be visually represented as a tree (Figure 1 ). Note that a tree in which the cues were inspected in the reverse order would make exactly the same classifications. A reason for looking up the age cue first is that it is quicker and easier to assess without error.
[Insert Figure 1] This decision tree is frugal because it uses only one or two cues. Moreover, it is also fast because it processes each cue by just asking and answering one question.
Informally, a fast and frugal tree is a classification tree where it is possible to make a decision after each question asked. Fast and frugal trees were first formally defined by Martignon et al. (2003) , who also describe general procedures for constructing fast and frugal trees.
A complete theory of fast and frugal trees is not yet available but their formal properties have been studied to some extent (Katsikopoulos & Martignon, 2003) .
Overall, there are good mathematical reasons why those trees are, under some conditions, accurate and robust. For example, they are robust because they do not attempt to model in detail the interdependencies between cues. It is a topic of further research to find the boundary conditions under which fast and frugal trees are accurate and robust.
The nonlinear, configural rules identified in classic work in the judgment and decision making literature (e.g., Kleinmuntz, 1963 Kleinmuntz, , 1990 Einhorn et al., 1979) can be combined to produce fast and frugal trees. This is not the whole story, however: fast and frugal trees are a special collection of rules: each time a rule is applied, it is possible, for a fast and frugal tree, that a decision is made. This psychological structure is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel one. Furthermore, as stated above, the formal analysis of fast and frugal trees has been recently pushed further Katsikopoulos & Martignon, 2003) .
Are Heuristics Acceptable?
Meehl was frustrated by clinicians' reluctance to use actuarial methods for making predictions. Recently, Dawes (2002; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989) and Bishop (2001) Kleinmuntz, 1990) . A common argument for the reluctance to use actuarial methods is that it is not clear to the physicians that the benefits outweigh the costs.
While we agree that this might go some way towards explaining the resistance to actuarial methods, here we highlight their complexity and lack of transparency that might hinder a more widespread use of them. Arguably, fast and frugal trees, in contrast, are easier to understand and apply for physicians than linear models (this hypothesis could be extended to include other fast and frugal heuristics and other professional decision makers)-a speculations physicians themselves seem to confirm (Green & Mehr, 1997; Elwyn et al., 2001) . One way to explain the greater acceptability of fast and frugal actuarial methods is it corresponds to the methods physicians have in their intuitive repertoire already. We are not aware of a study that has directly tested this, but some indirect evidence exists in the form that peoples' and heuristics' performance are similar (Green & Mehr, 1997; Dhami, 2003; Snook, Taylor, & Bennell, 2004) .
Conclusions
Meehl's Clinical versus Statistical Prediction is one of the classic contributions of research on judgment and decision making and one of the landmarks that gave rise to the field. It concluded that unaided clinical judgment is unable to outperform, and is usually even inferior to, judgment based on statistical models. The recent fast and frugal heuristics program seems to conflict with this conclusion,
showing that simple mechanisms, proposed as plausible candidate models of clinical judgments, can outperform actuarial models.
In this article, we started by trying to show that the contradiction is more apparent than real. For instance, we argued that clinicians, when unaided, might not always be able to properly apply fast and frugal heuristics. Furthermore, on a subtle level, the two research programs are based on surprisingly similar premises.
Specifically, we argued that the fast and frugal heuristics offer one way to provide models of human judgment that are both context-specific and nonlinear and also Paul Meehl and Fast and Frugal Heuristics acknowledge the natural boundedness of human cognition-characteristics that Meehl envisioned as fundamental to human judgment.
Moreover, we argued that the two research programs can be seen as potentially enriching each other. On the one hand, Meehl's work suggests that clinicians might not always be using fast and frugal heuristics, or at least they might not always be using them properly (otherwise they would have been almost or more accurate than linear actuarial methods). Thus, testing fast and frugal heuristics in the clinical domain promises to be an interesting test case for the approach.
On the other hand, the program of fast and frugal heuristics exemplifies how the clinical-actuarial divide can be bridged: Actuarial methods could be improved by becoming faster and more frugal. Specifically, data from large clinical studies could be used to identify a few very valid cues, which could then be combined in a lexicographic heuristic. Note that we do not advocate that clinicians are left alone to use fast and frugal actuarial methods. Due to the lack of feedback in the clinical domain, they can be expected to have difficulty singling out the most valid predictors.
We argue for actuarial methods that are fast and frugal, but highlight that they are also friendly. Because evidence suggests that fast and frugal heuristics mirror the cognitive processes underlying judgment and are easy to understand and apply (e.g. Snook et al., 2004) , they might be taken to indicate how to make actuarial methods friendlier. In addition, as they are highly transparent, fast and frugal heuristics allow clinical judges to still feel in control (ref that argues for lack of control?).
Taken together, the inferiority of clinical to statistical judgment identified by Meehl (1954) does not mean that the aim should be to supplement clinicians with complex prediction aids. Rather, as simple actuarial methods can achieve equally (or even more) accurate predictions and arguably are highly user-friendly to the clinician they might hold promise to eventually improve clinical judgment.
